Navegando por Assunto "Conjecture"
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Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) Uma análise do método de conjecturas e refutações Popperiano e de sua Aplicação ao ensino da Filosofia na educação básica(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2023) SIQUEIRA, Ailton dos Santos; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0951-6313The objective of this work is to examine whether the method of conjectures and refutations that Popper proposes for science can be applied to the teaching of Philosophy in basic education, more specifically at the elementary and secondary levels. This is a problem related to education and in particular to the way of teaching Philosophy. However, this question is not disconnected from his theory of science. Our intention is to show that such a method, with some adaptations, can be an effective procedure to provoke philosophical reflection, insofar as it enables not only the problematization, but also the critical discussion of the solutions proposed by the philosophers. In our analysis, we seek to show that Popper criticizes and rejects induction as a method of science and proposes as an alternative, that of conjecture and refutation. We elucidate the nature of such a procedure and its stages. Subsequently, we seek to highlight some reflections of the philosopher on pedagogy in order to support our reflections on the theme. We also present some proposals for the application of Popper's ideas to education, such as those of Bedoya and Duque (2019), who believe that the use of the method of conjecture and refutation in education enables the formation of students who are aware that science is not infallible and evidence how such a procedure can improve learning in general. Another proposal, the object of our analysis, was that of Oliveira (2008), who seeks to show how Popperian epistemology can foster a fallibilist approach in the teaching of the sciences. We also examine the suggestions of Segre (2009) to use Popperian critical rationalism in academic didactics as an alternative to the dogmatic and authoritarian teaching practiced in university education. And finally, we show how the method proposed by Popper can be applied to the teaching of Philosophy in basic education.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) Senso comum e Ciência em popper(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2020-11-25) SILVA, Adam Augusto Silva e; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0951-6313This The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between common sense and science in Popper's thought. The problem of our research is presented when Popper denies the ideal of episteme when defining science by its negative character, falseability. That is, his idea that science is fallible knowledge and liable to error clashes with those defended by the epistemological tradition that conceives it as a well-foundedcertain and demonstrated knowledge. Thus, by denying positive characteristics, traditionally recognized as typical of science, Popper's position raises the following question: What status does he reserves to science, since he does not identify it with episteme? In other words, by denying the ideal of episteme, would Popper be reducing science to doxa or common sense? This research will be guided by the hypothesis that Popper is far from reducing science to doxa or common sense, because, although he sees certain proximities between them, he also recognizes that science goes beyond common sense. Thus, in order to highlight Popper's position in the face of the problem outlined, we intend, first, to analyze how the relations between common sense and science have been treated by philosophers since antiquity, such as Plato and Aristotle and, also, more contemporaneously, by Bachelard. Later, we intend to show that, contrary to these philosophers who see doxa and episteme, or common sense and science as distinct forms of knowledge, Popper establishes very close relations between both, but does not reduce science to the level of common sense, to the extent that he conceives it as enlightened common sense.