Senso comum e Ciência em popper

Abstract

This The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between common sense and science in Popper's thought. The problem of our research is presented when Popper denies the ideal of episteme when defining science by its negative character, falseability. That is, his idea that science is fallible knowledge and liable to error clashes with those defended by the epistemological tradition that conceives it as a well-foundedcertain and demonstrated knowledge. Thus, by denying positive characteristics, traditionally recognized as typical of science, Popper's position raises the following question: What status does he reserves to science, since he does not identify it with episteme? In other words, by denying the ideal of episteme, would Popper be reducing science to doxa or common sense? This research will be guided by the hypothesis that Popper is far from reducing science to doxa or common sense, because, although he sees certain proximities between them, he also recognizes that science goes beyond common sense. Thus, in order to highlight Popper's position in the face of the problem outlined, we intend, first, to analyze how the relations between common sense and science have been treated by philosophers since antiquity, such as Plato and Aristotle and, also, more contemporaneously, by Bachelard. Later, we intend to show that, contrary to these philosophers who see doxa and episteme, or common sense and science as distinct forms of knowledge, Popper establishes very close relations between both, but does not reduce science to the level of common sense, to the extent that he conceives it as enlightened common sense.