A crítica de David Hume ao ceticismo pirrônico na obra "Investigação sobre o entendimento humano" e a crítica contemporânea ao pirronismo de "Sexto empírico"

Abstract

Our goal with this work is to develop a exposition of the David Hume’s criticism against the Pyrrhonean Skeptics in the work An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, showing that it stands in the light of the contemporary understanding of skepticism outlined by Sextus Empiricus in Book I of Outlines of Pyrrhonism. We will see by what argument Sextus argues, in the side of the pyrrhonist, a life without beliefs. Then, we compare the work of Sextus with, mainly, the debate’s conclusions between Michael Frede e Myles Burnyeat (urbane and rustic interpretations) concern the possibility of the pyrrhonist engage coherently in his Pyrrhonism, t. is, the Pyrrhonean modus vivendi without beliefs, endorsing the Burnyeat’s position about it infeasibility. We will present, furthermore, a virtual bibliography by which Hume could have educated himself concerning Sextus and his Pyrrhonism, objections presented by Julia Annas against the comprehension of Hume about ancient skepticism and, finally, we will ponder the position of some commentators who see in the mitigated skepticism of Hume, first of all, a sort of Pyrrhonism. Armed with this analyzes, to the extent that the core of Hume’s criticism is the total suspension of beliefs by the pyrrhonists, as well as the inescapable human nature grounded in the instinctive mechanism of habit or custom as the generator of beliefs concerning the empirical objects of our reasoning, then, one cannot deny the validity of Hume’s critique.