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Limites epistemológicos da filosofia dialética na produção do conhecimento científico em educação
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2017-06-06) SOARES, Raimunda Lucena Melo; CORRÊA, Paulo Sérgio de Almeida; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7102416953096612
Study on the complexity of the epistemological limitations of the dialectical philosophy in researches in the field of education. How are the epistemological limitations of dialectical philosophy configured in research in education, despite the recognition of its heuristic capacity and its logical organicity? What is the place of importance attributed to the Dialectic Philosophy within the production of scientific knowledge in the field of educational research in Brazil? What is the Dialectic Philosophy receptivity in the investigative practices of researchers in education in Brazil? How to setup the scientific research method and what themes and study objects are privileged in the construction of scientific knowledge in education? What are the epistemological limits in dialectical approach when its assumptions are applied in the construction of doctoral theses from the Graduate Program in Education? The general objective of the study was to understand and expose the epistemological limits that permeate the formation of researchers and the construction of scientific knowledge in the area of education under the influence of Dialectical Philosophy. Specifically, it aims to analyze the importance given to Dialectic Philosophy in knowledge production in theses developed within the Postgraduate Programs of education area; to reflect on the receptivity of the Dialectic Philosophy in the investigative practices of researchers in education and contributions of historical dialectical materialism for the researcher formation in this subject area; to discuss the construction of knowledge logic expressed in the research methods used in the doctoral theses aiming the production of scientific knowledge in education area; and analyze the epistemological implications of the dialectical approach in the production of scientific knowledge resulting from doctoral theses. Starting from an epistemological approach based on Dialectical Philosophy, especially materialism and historical ones. The bibliographical and documentary sources were chosen as the main basis of the research, highlighting works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Hegel and doctoral thesis supervised by Professors Antônio Joaquim Severino and Dermeval Saviani. The historical time span of the research covered the period from 1974 to 2015. I could see that the dialectical approach in educational research, including in its historical materialist conception, presents limitations that are not only of the order of the theoretical insufficiency of the researchers who adopt their presuppositions in the researches they carry out, but because of the complexity in which the tensions originate Epistemological implications implicit in such philosophy, due to the contradictory character in which the movement of the real and its own logic is established, the difficulty of putting into practice dialectical historical materialism, in the perspective of the praxis transforming reality, as well as the way authors construct their heuristic objects and methods in the process of producing scientific knowledge. Therefore, the multiplicity of dimensions and relations of the object in the historical context implies still more in the complex presence of the limits of the dialectic, in spite of its heuristic capacity in the researches in education. Based on the principle of contradiction, I have been able to conclude that these limits are explained by principles and conceptions at the heart of dialectical logic, both from an ideal point of view and from a material perspective, and which are forged along with epistemological possibilities. Finally I inquire and point out some vestiges of the limitations faced in the construction of this thesis.
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A Luta pelo significado: a constituição política do Entremeio (s) no mundo-da-vida
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2021-07-05) FERREIRA, Rafael Bastos; CASTRO, Fábio Fonseca de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5700042332015787; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9964-8282
The phenomenological concept of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) is the philosophical framework that moves the critical horizon of the thesis and justifies all the problems contained. In general, in addition to punctuating a teleological criticism about his departure from everyday life, based on this vital ground, we submerged towards an investigation that originally unveiled its political dimension. Thematizing the pre-political experience, from a political phenomenology, the problem of the alien world (Fremdwelt) and the home world (Heimwelt) appears under the horizon of a phenomenology of strangeness. The political phenomenon, after all the exercise of “Bracketing”, will emerge a vital space – of speech, interlacing, of the space-between, of action, of acting – which I will call between-mean(s). This foundation has precedents in Hannah Arendt's concept of politics: between-men and between-spaces. My effort, in addition to expanding this concept, aims to investigate the constitutive nature of between-mean(s) from the political experiences of four groups organized politically. So, we started from the following problems: I) how is it constituted or who constitutes it? II) How is it born, developed, and established? III) How are the speeches structured and who holds them? IV) In what way and way (means) do the subjects (politicians) have such access and how is their structure established? V) What are the subjective and intersubjective motivations that lead the subjects to act, “to turn toward”? Three are the “Constitution Stages” that will phenomenologically elucidate these issues. Therefore, the thesis understands that a new beginning of phenomenology was announced by Husserl in “Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften”. This beginning is about a renewal that calls for an effort to establish a phenomenology of the political world, or rather, a phenomenology of the political world (Politischen Welt)
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A natureza e o caráter das leis naturais em Popper
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-03-15) ARAUJO, Caroline Soares de; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781
Popper presents, through a series of works and articles, different characterizations of natural laws. Initially, he defines such laws as strictly universal statements that, due to their logical properties, are falsifiable. In a second moment, as a reply to William Kneale’s criticism, Popper starts to emphasize the necessary character of natural laws. The aim of this research is to determine if these two characterizations presented by Popper concerning natural laws are either divergent either complementary and if there is any contradiction between these two conceptions and the theory of science supported by the philosopher. Therefore, the problem of this research is structured around popperian’s characterization of natural laws and the concept of physical necessity, apparently contradicting the falsifiable nature that the philosopher assigns to these laws in previous works. We defend the hypothesis that the idea of laws as statements that express necessity just apparently contradicts Popper’s falsificationism and conjecturalism. Actually, it completes the first characterization of laws as strictly universal statements, being, the way it was formulated, consistent with popperian theory of science.
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A objetividade do conhecimento e a deposição do sujeito na epistemologia de Popper
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-09-04) RABELO, Wallace Andrew Lopes; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781
The aim of this work is to investigate how objective knowledge is possible for Popper and to elucidate why the subject does not play a relevant role in the process of knowing. Popperian conception moves away from the epistemological tradition that values the subject in the process of knowing, understood by the philosopher as subjectivist view, compared with his objectivist view. In this sense, we intend to demonstrate that his conception of objective knowledge is based on a theory of three worlds, which is fundamental for the comprehension of it, since it’s precisely in world three that the products of subject reside, thus where objective knowledge is. We will show that this third world is linguistic, highlighting the importance of language for knowledge to become objective. Another aspect we intend to analyze is scientific objectivity, since Popper, besides objective knowledge in general, talks on his works about a more specific dimension related to science. We intend to clarify the logical-empirical and social conditions that allowed the debate and criticism of produced theories and, consequently, scientific objectivity. Lastly, we will present criticism of Thomas Kuhn to Popperian conception of objectivity. Since the philosopher does not make a direct critique to the way Popper conceives it, we will highlight his objections to Popper’s falsificationism and his considerations about subjective factors that influence the process of choosing theories, thus, risking the possibility of scientific objectivity.
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Progresso científico e verdade em Popper
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2015-08) DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis
This paper aims to show that to solve the question of the possibility of scientific progress, Popper had to introduce the idea of truth into his theory of science. This conception of progress, in terms of the notion of truth, was only outlined in the work Conjectures and Refutations (1963). The idea that the goal of science is truth does not appear in his early works. When Popper wrote his The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934), science was defined in terms of logic-methodological rules, and not of its goals. Scientific progress was conceived based on the notions of testability and corroboration of theories, logical and methodological requirements for a theory to be considered scientific. Popper did not relate the question of scientific progress to notion of truth in this work, because when he wrote it he did not have a consistent theory of truth. It was only after Tarski had written his article on the semantic conception of truth that Popper, based on this conception of truth, could complement his thesis about the progress of science expounded in The Logic of Scientific Discovery with a theory about the content of truth and the approximation to the truth.
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As representações inconscientes e o Eu Penso em Kant
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-01-10) BRITO, Aline Brasiliense dos Santos; SOUZA, Luís Eduardo Ramos de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7892900979434696
This research aims to analyze the concept of unconscious representations in Kant and its relation with the concept of transcendental apperception, or the I think. The existence of a gender itself for representations, the unconscious ones, are pointed in several of Kant’s works. Among them can be mentioned in Anthropology in a pragmatic point of view and Criticism on pure reason. They are representations that can be bolded in Kant’s philosophy in two main aspects. The fist one the amplitude, for it holds the theoretical field, that is practical and aesthetic. The second one the positivity, in the sense of performing a positive role both in knowledge production, and in the other mental processes – aesthetic and moral. However, when considering the unconscious concept as opposite of the transcendental apperception principle, a problematical appears: how to understand the existence of those mentioned representations in Kant’s philosophy, if the I think implies in a necessary reference of all representation to the conscience? Kant is very emphatic affirming that, if the representations don’t refer to this principle, they are but nothing to the subject (Criticism of pure reason, B131). As an effect, proposing to give a solution to the problematical, three relevant hypotheses will be raised about this matter. The first one is Locke’s thesis, in which the unconscious representations are not admitted, for the fact that they indicate a contradiction in its own conscience. After all, when the matter is an “I” that not always has conscience of its actions, it is possible to say that there is a certain indetermination concerning the identity of this “I”. The second one is Heidemann’s thesis (2012), according to it, the unconscious representation is divided in two species, in which just one of them, the unconscious by degrees representations, refer to the transcendental apperception. At last, the third thesis is La Rocca’s (2007), in which we agree in almost its whole. Through it, it is possible to understand the transcendental apperception principle, always with a structural possibility, and not as an affectivity in psychological terms – to be conscious or unconscious -, but as a logic structure that concerns to the form by which the representation needs to refer itself.