Navegando por Assunto "Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804"

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Os dois momentos da Aufklärung em Kant
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2016-08-29) NERY, Regina Lucia de Carvalho; CORÔA, Pedro Paulo da Costa; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3785172545288511; MEIRELLES, Agostinho de Freitas; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7826494085324141
This dissertation aims to present what the Enlightenment (Aufklärung) to Kant, as he conceives it to distinguish it in theoretical (intellectual) and practical (moral) and how produces the unity of these two moments of the Aufklärung. Therefore, it is based on the booklet answer the question: What is "enlightenment? In reviews and other works that deal with the subject, as well as some of his interpreters: Ernest Cassirer, Michael Foucault and Rubens Rodrigues Torres Filho, presenting the thesis into three chapters: the first, the modern concept of enlightenment in Kant, addressing in general, the modern context and influences that Kant received this context, the English Enlightenment, Newton and Hume and the French Enlightenment, Rousseau recognized by Kant as decisive in the direction of his thinking and his understanding of the Enlightenment (Aufklärung ); in the second, the concept of Enlightenment (Aufklärung) in theory, the works Critique of Pure Reason, Prolegomena and The Progress of Metaphysics, and practical, in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Customs Grounds; and, third, the unity of these two moments of the Aufklärung in Kant.
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Foucault leitor de Kant: da antropologia à aufklärung
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2015-11-30) AUGUSTO, Ricardo Pontieri; CHAVES, Ernani Pinheiro; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5741253213910825
We followed three stages of Foucault. readings of Kant's work. From 1961 to 1969 Foucault analyzes archaeologically the relationship between the Critical Project and the Anthropology of Kant, highlighting the emergence of the opening the possibility of confusion between the empirical and the transcendental fields, as occurred later with other thinkers. The opening would have emerged in the Kantian anthropological project when he presented the question "What is man?" With the confusion the man, that was a logical instance in critical project, became an empirical-transcendental double and explanatory principle. From 1970-1978 Foucault genealogically investigated the displacement and articulation between the Critical Project and Aufklärung carried out by Kant in response to "What is Aufklärung?" analyzing and defining his actuality as a new attitude of the man who seeks to become rationally autonomous. Foucault points out in Kant's answer a critical attitude conception that would be close to that he himself formulated starting from the research of resistance to transformations of power relations resulting from state governmentalization control processes, where the ancient right of life and death had been replaced by the government of the conduct of individuals in various fields. From the end of the 70s, and still investigating the Kant’s Aufklärung, Foucault proposes that have occurred in the thought of that philosopher the inauguration of two new philosophical traditions: - the Analytical Truth in the wake of the Critical Project and the Critical Ontology of ourselves in the wake of Aufklärung, to the last one he aligns. In the second tradition Kant, in conflict with the perspective of traditional ontology of being, has proposed a new critical ontology when shifted the epistemological-transcendental question "What do I know?" to "What is this happening?", and bringing to the philosophical-historical field new ontological questions about the present, the individual and the transformation processes of men's attitude. The new critical ontology, as Foucault denominated, is for him the foundation of ethical and political attitude of franking limits, unlike Kant tried to establish formal limits that men could not overcome by individual decision.
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Os princípios e limites metafísicos do estado jurídico em Kant
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2014-11-11) CARDOSO, Victor Moraes; CORÔA, Pedro Paulo da Costa; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3785172545288511
This dissertation sets in a bibliographic research, of an analytical, critical and reflective nature about an epistemological universe that encompasses the principles and metaphysical boundaries of the Legal State in Kant, which addresses the rational grounds, as immutable and universal archetypes, of the Legal State, from what Immanuel Kant teaches in his Doctrine of Right. With this guideline and considering the misinterpretations of the fundamental principles of law, preliminarily, outline some divergent conceptions of the said project, which are 'rejected' in the course of this dissertation. Then it explains the role played by reason in the theoretical and practical purposes, with the aim of fixing the locus occupied by a Moral System in Practical Philosophy. This system consists of two subdivisions, namely Ethics and the Law. Thus, it is established law as a practical science, with its concept. And yet, it discusses the theme of freedom, which pervades the entire path taken in the development, its relation to practical reason, as well as the distinction that exists between will and freedom of choice. These considerations allow subsequently characterize the law, but without forgetting to distinguish it from the Ethics. Also can explain the principle and the universal law of the Right as criteria of legitimacy and justice, law and principle that refer to freedom of choice within which coercion is presented as an analytical element. The accountability is another issue addressed, which presupposes the idea of freedom, whose absence would deprive the law of all meaning. Thus, it follows the private law, arguing it until reaching its premise, whereby it is possible to get right on any object outside the freedom of choice. It examines, instead, the institutes of Private Law, say, the Right in rem, Personal rights and the Personal Rights of in rem character. Is entered, then, the Public Law, presenting the Legal State as guarantor of rights that are pre-existing. On this track, going up to the formal requirements of the State, which is the tripartition of powers and their relationships. Other points for the Legal State are also addressed, such as citizenship and its relationship to state power, the alleged right of revolution, the duty to reform the Civil Constitution, the Right to Punish. It is noteworthy that try to overcome a difficulty that is not addressed in any written consulted: the accountability of public officials. However, the shape of the Legal State is also addressed. Moreover, spin up some lines to individual and social rights and their relationship to the fundamentals of law. Anyway, after all trodden path, it appears that Legal State is a duty imposed by practical reason - an end in itself which runs from metaphysical principles - ones who can offer us an unchanging model and irreplaceable State.
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As representações inconscientes e o Eu Penso em Kant
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-01-10) BRITO, Aline Brasiliense dos Santos; SOUZA, Luís Eduardo Ramos de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7892900979434696
This research aims to analyze the concept of unconscious representations in Kant and its relation with the concept of transcendental apperception, or the I think. The existence of a gender itself for representations, the unconscious ones, are pointed in several of Kant’s works. Among them can be mentioned in Anthropology in a pragmatic point of view and Criticism on pure reason. They are representations that can be bolded in Kant’s philosophy in two main aspects. The fist one the amplitude, for it holds the theoretical field, that is practical and aesthetic. The second one the positivity, in the sense of performing a positive role both in knowledge production, and in the other mental processes – aesthetic and moral. However, when considering the unconscious concept as opposite of the transcendental apperception principle, a problematical appears: how to understand the existence of those mentioned representations in Kant’s philosophy, if the I think implies in a necessary reference of all representation to the conscience? Kant is very emphatic affirming that, if the representations don’t refer to this principle, they are but nothing to the subject (Criticism of pure reason, B131). As an effect, proposing to give a solution to the problematical, three relevant hypotheses will be raised about this matter. The first one is Locke’s thesis, in which the unconscious representations are not admitted, for the fact that they indicate a contradiction in its own conscience. After all, when the matter is an “I” that not always has conscience of its actions, it is possible to say that there is a certain indetermination concerning the identity of this “I”. The second one is Heidemann’s thesis (2012), according to it, the unconscious representation is divided in two species, in which just one of them, the unconscious by degrees representations, refer to the transcendental apperception. At last, the third thesis is La Rocca’s (2007), in which we agree in almost its whole. Through it, it is possible to understand the transcendental apperception principle, always with a structural possibility, and not as an affectivity in psychological terms – to be conscious or unconscious -, but as a logic structure that concerns to the form by which the representation needs to refer itself.