Navegando por Assunto "Kelsen, Hans, 1881-1973"

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A ciência do direito como uma ciência humana: estudo sobre os fundamentos filosóficos e jurídicos do processo de autonomização epistemológica da Ciência do Direito de Hans Kelsen
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2014-05-29) MARTINS, Ricardo Evandro Santos; COSTA, Paulo Sérgio Weyl Albuquerque; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4135075517359609
The paper explains the philosophical foundations of the process of autonomization of the Hans Kelsen‟s Legal Science. The studies are focused on the debate about the epistemological foundation of the Human Sciences and how this influenced the Pure Theory of Law. The objectives are: a) investigate how the nineteenth-century debate about the epistemological foundation of the Human Sciences influenced the formulation of the kelsenian Legal Science; b) to study what are the legal and philosophical assumptions of the Kelsen‟s Pure Doctrine of Law c) to know what would have been the contributions of the Master of Vienna in this quest for reasons for give autonomy to Legal Science from Natural Sciences. Thus, the first Chapter discusses the Philosophical Positivism of August Comte and John Stuart Mill. The second Chapter introduces the movement of Neo-kantianism since Adolf Trendelenburg until the Marburg School. The third Chapter wants to know about the Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey and how He tried to make a "Critique of Historical Reason", as well as reasons for the Human Science comprehensive method. The fourth Chapter talks about the Neo-kantianism of the School of Baden, especially the Heinrich Rickert‟s Philosophy, explaining mainly the Principle of the worlds and The Principle for the concept-formation. The fifth Chapter deals with the formation of the tradition of legal positivism of the nineteenth century, especially the Germanic world. And finally, the sixth and last Chapter deals with the refutation by Kelsen to the Thesis of Gerber, Laband and Jellinek, and also, this finally chapter talks about the "the two methodological limits" of his Pure Doctrine of Law that, in the end, it can respond: yes, Kelsen did the Science of Law as Human Science, but not the same way as Rickert and other philosophers who discussed this topic since the nineteenth century. Kelsen was defending the idea of a Normative and Autonomous Legal Science that presupposes the postulate of axiological Relativism.
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O formalismo no direito e a ética dos valores: teoria dos valores em Hans Kelsen e Max Scheler
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-05-04) FONSECA, Yuri Ikeda; MATOS, Saulo Monteiro Martinho de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1755999011402142
The philosophy of values (Wertphilosophie), appearing in the context of the neo-Kantian investigations of the School of Baden in the late 19th Century, is a theoretical approach focused on the study of the phenomenon called value. The first chapter of this work, with the methodology of a history of ideas, discusses the formalist ethics of Immanuel Kant, the origin of the philosophy of values in the theories of Franz Brentano and neo-Kantians Hermann Lotze, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask, and the division of the theory of values into an objectivist strand and a subjectivist one, trying to demonstrate that the latter has prevailed due to the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche's conceptions of values. The second chapter deals with Max Weber's idea of axiological neutrality (Wertfreiheit) of the sciences and Hans Kelsen's legal formalism, which is supported by a subjectivist and skeptical theory of values, both representing the subjectivist view. It is also presented Carlos Santiago Nino’s argument against the idea, defended by Kelsen, that only a relativistic conception of values could promote the democratic ideals of tolerance. The third chapter is dedicated, after a brief comment on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, to Max Scheler's arguments against Kantian ethical formalism to support an objectivist axiology based on the notion that values are material contents that can be known a priori and are, therefore, capable of substantiating a nonformal ethic. It is concluded that, though Scheler’s statement of grounds is problematic in considering the knowledge of values as a function of emotions, not of reason, on the other hand his formulation of the a priori and of a scope of pure axiology with rules similar to those of logic facilitate objections to the presuppositions of the subjectivist axiology.