A leitura epistemologica popperiana da filosofia teórica kantiana

Abstract

This research aims to analyze Karl Popper’s interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy and to discuss its character, problems and merits. Popper’s view on Kant reflects the latter’s relevance and influence over the former’s thoughts. Popper acknowledges, in many of his works, Kant’s contribution to his own theory of Science. However, at the same time that he praises kantian philosophy, he also criticizes it in many ways, considering himself as an unorthodox kantian. Therefore, the central problem of the presente research is: how does Popper understands Kant’s theoretical philosophy? And, furthermore, what are the virtues, difficulties and problems of Popper’s interpretation? Our hypothesis is that Popper reads Kant’s philosophy in an epistemological and unorthodox manner, ascribing to Kant problems of his own philosophy and viewing Kant’s work through the lens of his own glasses, thus, “Popper’s Kant” has different ideas and problems than the Kant who wrote the Critique of Pure Reason. Initially, we intend to characterize Popper’s interpretation of Kant as epistemological and, hence, close to the Neo-Kantian school of Marburg. Then, we aim to analytically reconstruct Popper’s interpretation of the allegedly “Kant’s problems”: the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation. Lastly, we mean to critically appraise Popper’s view on Kant, by discussing its limitations and possibilities.