As objeções de Kant aos argumentos teístas na Dialética Transcendental da Crítica da Razão Pura: uma crítica a partir de aspectos da filosofia analítica da religião

Abstract

One of Kant's critical theological investigations is into the so-called theistic proofs: the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological arguments. Kant concludes, in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), that satisfactory proofs are impossible from such arguments of theoretical reason. According to the philosopher, this is because the ontological argument fails and, ultimately, how the cosmological and physicotheological proofs depend on it, this implies the impossibility of all attempts to demonstrate the existence of God. Historically, this led to the abandonment of theistic proofs in philosophy. However, these arguments have resurfaced with the so-called analytic philosophy of religion, through philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga (1974, 2012), Charles Malcolm (1960), Richard Swinburne (2019), and William Lane Craig (1979). Faced with this recent critical reception of the Transcendental Dialectic, this research investigates the following question: Kant's objections make the theistic arguments of theoretical reason impossible? With this in mind, the general aim of this dissertation is to carry out an analytical critique of Kant's objections to theistic arguments from theoretical reason, intending to defend the hypothesis that Kant's objection to theistic arguments fails to demonstrate the impossibility of such arguments.