A gênese do modo causal de seleção por consequências na obra de B. F. Skinner: uma análise histórico-conceitual (1930-1990)

Abstract

Given the centrality of the notion of selection by consequences in B. F Skinner's work, many studies have discussed such a principle, including statements about when it became evident the proposal of selection by consequences as a general explanatory mode for the behavior in Skinner's work. Such statements are, however, inconsistent. It is argued, on the one hand, that a selectionist perspective of Skinner can be observed when the author makes clear analogies between his proposal and the Darwinian theory of natural selection. On the other hand, there are those who identify an affiliation with a selectionist epistemology already at the beginning of the author's work, or even after his references to Darwin. This miscellany of statements seems to result, first, from the lack of delimitation of the very aspects used to refer to a selectionist perspective, as well as to define the notion of selection by consequences presented by Skinner. Consequently, these divergences evoke some questions: What aspects are sufficient to characterize a selectionist epistemology, from a Skinnerian point of view? When were these aspects presented in the author's work and how were they constructed throughout his scientific production? This study aims to provide a historical-conceptual analysis of the genesis of the causal mode of selection by consequences in Skinner's work. More specifically, from criteria previously established as sufficient to characterize the selectionism proposed by Skinner, it was sought to investigate the constructing process of these criteria in the course of his writings, from 1930 to 1980. For this, four chapters will be presented. In the first, it is argued that the notion of selection by consequences can be defined from three criteria: a new causal mode, which presupposes a selective role of consequences; a notion of evolution based on the complementarity between the processes of variation and selection; a proposition of explanation throughout three evolutionary histories. From the analysis carried out in the last three chapters, it is discussed that in the 1930s and 1940s, there is insufficient evidence from a selectionist perspective. As early as the 1950s, this explanatory principle proved to be partially consolidated, since selectionism did not reflect at this time an alternative notion of causality. It is concluded that it was after the 1960s that selection by consequences was presented as a causal mode based on a relationship of probabilistic interdependence between events, which explains the origin and evolution of the behavioral phenomenon as being the product of three histories of variation and selection.