Dignidade humana, humilhação e forma de vida

Abstract

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: (a) human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and (b) some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid.” Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights.” This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the experience of incapacity or absence of self-determination.