Judicialização da regulação e perda da qualidade do fornecimento de energia elétrica em áreas periférica

Abstract

This study analyzes the results from a structural change in the regulation of the public electricity service implemented as a national reform in the late 1990s. We compared the quality of the electricity supply for two companies, one private and one public, operating in the northern Brazil. The quality indicators for the supplied energy deteriorated for the private company, and once penalized by the regulatory agency, the company systematically judicialized the punitive processes. This strategy was not observed in the actions taken by the public company. The possibility for institutional judicialization occurs because these agencies are dependent on judicial frameworks, which operate within a logic that is structurally different than managerial logic. We concluded that judicialization creates the opportunity for procrastination-based behaviors within the context of the regulatory framework for public services, thereby impeding the public strategy of regulation.