Navegando por Assunto "Aristotle"

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O conceito de ontologia no livro IV da metafísica de Aristóteles
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2023-09-04) SOARES, Élida Teixeira; CORÔA, Pedro Paulo da Costa; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3785172545288511
Ontology is a domain that spans the entire history of known philosophy, from the Greeks to important contemporary thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and his ontology of Dasein. But, just as each philosophical system seems to be different from each other, when we try to conceptualize ontology, a certain confusion arises, after all, as we see in Heidegger, he understands that in the history of philosophy, the forgetting of being, that is, of itself, occurred. object of ontology, in the form in which it was conceived. And one of the targets of Heidegger's criticism of the forgetfulness of being is Aristotle, just as Kant also seeks to make corrections to the categorical system with which things are determined. For this reason, we are proposing to study the concept of ontology in Aristotle, focusing our analysis on what he says about this episteme in Book IV of his work Metaphysics. Our objective, with this proposal, is to know whether it is possible to find in Aristotle a precise definition of ontology that guides us in the study of this part of philosophy.
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O conflito entre razão e paixão em Medeia sob a perspectiva da teoria aristotélica das paixões
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2021-09-10) LOPES, Jeam Carlos Andrade; SOUZA, Jovelina Maria Ramos de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0475424515288539; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1249-1068
The present work intends to interpret the conflict between logos and pathos, in the protagonist Medea of the homonymous work, from the Aristotelian theory of passions. In the Rhetoric of the Passions, which is part of Aristotle's Rhetoric, anger is defined as the desire for revenge that involves sadness and con-tempt for a particular person. For Aristotle, the choleric thinks it's nice to think that you can get what you want, so he hopes that revenge will work, because he craves something possible. If we take Euripides' character Medea for a moment, we will see that this definition fits: Jason feels contempt for Medea and she relentlessly desires revenge on him, so much so that she finds a plausible, albeit extreme and un-justifiable solution – that of killing her own children – in order to satisfy the emotion felt, cholera, which is in no way irrational, or inhuman the, as long presumed among scholars. Therefore, we try to define first by which definition and theoretical current we will be guided by analyzing emotion, so that we can finally point out that we will not follow the interpretation of the conflict between pathos and logos, where these two elements are explained in opposition, as if they were two opposing and disconnected poles, in which emotion is considered an irrational part, source of unbridled and unconscious desires, and reason the conscious and controlling part of passions. An explanation already widely used for the conflict pre-sent in Medea, starting from the reading of Aristotelian ethics, and the phenomenon of acrasia, is that the soul of the character, when it clashes with him, would expose the appetizing part, of the irrational element, on the one hand, and the rational part, on the other. This aspect, we emphasize, will not be analyzed in our research. In fact, when we try to answer the question that worries us, as much as it leads us to focus on the most specific human capacity, that is, what distinguishes us from other ani-mals: rational activity, which allows the individual to reflect on his wills and desires before acting well in society, we in no way stress, or guide us by any author who places emotions as sources of irrationality, because, after all, they can be intelligent beacons that something needs to be changed in behavior, both of the one who feels the affection, and in the one who may have motivated the emergence of the af-fection. Based on this understanding, emotional responses will be had, which will depend on the per-sonality and character of the individual. In the case of Medea, before the event of philicide, his charac-ter can already be considered dubious, or at least prone to commit atrocities for the sake of his well-being: the killing of his own family members, which is counted other poetic material, other than that of the tragedigrapher. Thus, far from imputing an anachronic view to Euripides' work, we will offer, in this work, a reading that has its primary view in the Rhetoric of Aristotle's passions, given that for his study of emotions, the philosopher rescues elements of the tragic: human vulnerability in the face of fortune. Likewise, we will work with Ethics to Nicomachus in order to show, based on Nussbaum mainly, that the way of living based on rationality and balance of emotions, can be the output given by Aristotle to subtract or minimize the power of fortune in the life of the human being.
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A formação do raciocínio prático a partir da apreensão dos fins e da deliberação dos meios na ética nicomaqueia
(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2024-04-05) POMPEU, Ian Silveira; PITTELOUD, Luca Jean; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0887702139830510; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1864-5742
This dissertation investigates the formation of practical reasoning in Aristotelian psychology, using the Nicomachean Ethics as its main basis. References to other works are also considered, as they serve as a necessary condition for developing an answer to that central problem. Chapter I presents the conditions necessary for a science about the human soul. This requires understanding the Aristotelian definition of science (1.1), the foundation on which all theoretical sciences are based (1.2), and the specific foundations of psychology (1.3). This exposition employs the explanation of the Principle of Contradiction found in Book IV of the Metaphysics, explores the polysemic notion of ousia, and examines how its principles, form and matter, relate to the study of the human soul. Chapter II delves into the study of the human soul as form, using the methodology presented in De Anima, investigating soul operations, and exploring the connection with virtues as set out in the Nicomachean Ethics. In Chapter III, it is discussed the practical syllogism as a combination of knowledge about ends and deliberation about means, through (3.1) the situation of the problem in the academic sphere with the contribution of Elizabeth Anscombe; (3.2) the critical evaluation of Jessica Moss's response to the problem of the mode of apprehension and the nature of the first practical principles and the defense of the noetic-experiential apprehension according to its scope; and (3.3) the comparison of readings regarding the object of phronesis and the presentation of the specification of the general ends as a proposed interpretation.