A natureza e o caráter das leis naturais em Popper

Abstract

Popper presents, through a series of works and articles, different characterizations of natural laws. Initially, he defines such laws as strictly universal statements that, due to their logical properties, are falsifiable. In a second moment, as a reply to William Kneale’s criticism, Popper starts to emphasize the necessary character of natural laws. The aim of this research is to determine if these two characterizations presented by Popper concerning natural laws are either divergent either complementary and if there is any contradiction between these two conceptions and the theory of science supported by the philosopher. Therefore, the problem of this research is structured around popperian’s characterization of natural laws and the concept of physical necessity, apparently contradicting the falsifiable nature that the philosopher assigns to these laws in previous works. We defend the hypothesis that the idea of laws as statements that express necessity just apparently contradicts Popper’s falsificationism and conjecturalism. Actually, it completes the first characterization of laws as strictly universal statements, being, the way it was formulated, consistent with popperian theory of science.