Os Direitos humanos segundo John Finnis e as críticas desde as concepções tomistas e não tomistas internas à tradição do direito natural clássico

Abstract

This master thesis presents a critical investigation about the John Finnis human rights concept, and how much it really remains aligned to the foundations of the classic natural rights tradition. The research focus, therefore, consists of analyzing the reasons, problems and advantages of Finnis theoretical choices regarding human rights, his approximation to the referred tradition, as well as his distance. The criticism on Finnis is carried out on three levels. First, a critique of thomists who are receptive to human rights, notably Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska, Henry Veatch, on the issue of naturalistic fallacy, the need of ontology and the relationship between human rights and philosophical anthropology. The second is a criticism from the thomists not receptive to human rights - Villey and MacIntyre - about the need to be more critical about the language of rights and human rights. The third is a criticism from non-thomistic jusnaturalists, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, about the need to understand natural rights more profoundly, based on the symbol to what is by nature just, as well as to deep the relationship between natural law and definition of the complete community. Each criticisms endeavors to show the classic conception of the tradition of classical natural rights, in order to confront Finnis positions on his conception of human rights, and how much it sometimes challenge conceptions of the mentioned tradition.