Dissertações em Filosofia (Mestrado) - PPGFIL/IFCH
URI Permanente para esta coleçãohttps://repositorio.ufpa.br/handle/2011/5863
O Mestrado Acadêmico iniciou-se em 2011, foi reconhecido pela CAPES nos termos da Portaria nº 84, de 22/12/2014 pertence ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia (PPGFIL) do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH) da Universidade Federal do Pará (UFPA).
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Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) Uma análise do método de conjecturas e refutações Popperiano e de sua Aplicação ao ensino da Filosofia na educação básica(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2023) SIQUEIRA, Ailton dos Santos; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0951-6313The objective of this work is to examine whether the method of conjectures and refutations that Popper proposes for science can be applied to the teaching of Philosophy in basic education, more specifically at the elementary and secondary levels. This is a problem related to education and in particular to the way of teaching Philosophy. However, this question is not disconnected from his theory of science. Our intention is to show that such a method, with some adaptations, can be an effective procedure to provoke philosophical reflection, insofar as it enables not only the problematization, but also the critical discussion of the solutions proposed by the philosophers. In our analysis, we seek to show that Popper criticizes and rejects induction as a method of science and proposes as an alternative, that of conjecture and refutation. We elucidate the nature of such a procedure and its stages. Subsequently, we seek to highlight some reflections of the philosopher on pedagogy in order to support our reflections on the theme. We also present some proposals for the application of Popper's ideas to education, such as those of Bedoya and Duque (2019), who believe that the use of the method of conjecture and refutation in education enables the formation of students who are aware that science is not infallible and evidence how such a procedure can improve learning in general. Another proposal, the object of our analysis, was that of Oliveira (2008), who seeks to show how Popperian epistemology can foster a fallibilist approach in the teaching of the sciences. We also examine the suggestions of Segre (2009) to use Popperian critical rationalism in academic didactics as an alternative to the dogmatic and authoritarian teaching practiced in university education. And finally, we show how the method proposed by Popper can be applied to the teaching of Philosophy in basic education.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) Ciência e ética em Karl Popper(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2022-03-24) DIAS, Leandro José dos Passos; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0951-6313The more traditional studies about Popper’s philosophy have focused on aspects of his theory of science or his political philosophy or, even, on establishing links between them. More recently, new studies have emerged pinpointing a new hermeneutics that aims to show that ethics is at the root of his philosophy. Our work, assuming that there is an ethics at the base of his thought, intends to analyze it from a more specific perspective: that of science itself. Thereby, we will investigate the following question: can we say that Popper's conception of science involves an ethical dimension? Or rather, is there a relationship between science and ethics in the philosopher’s thought? We will consider that his notion of science presupposes an ethics, which is manifested in his pretensions to demarcate science, in the principles that guide it and in the responsibilities he assigns to scientists. Our analysis of the issue intends to start from Popper’s own rationalism, which he considers as the result of an ethical decision. In this sense, we seek to analyze its character, distinguish it from other forms of rationalism, oppose it to irrationalism and uncover its ethical foundations assisted by the studies of Kiesewetter, Artigas and Oliveira. In addition, to stablish its relations with ethics. Once these characteristic aspects of Popper’s rationalism have been clarified, we will try to show how ethics is present in his conception of science. We’ll show that Popper, when proposing his criterion of scientificity and complementing it with certain methodological rules, makes it clear that the adoption of such rules involves scientists’ decisions based on values and also generates certain ethical commitments. Furthermore, we intend to demonstrate that ethics is present in the ethical principles that guide science, such as fallibility, reasonable discussion, search for truth, honesty and that such principles are closely related to the idea of selfcriticism and tolerance. Finally, we will address the ethical responsibilities of scientists, emphasizing applied sciences. We will show that Popper proposes a new ethics for Science based on the Hippocratic oath.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) A leitura epistemologica popperiana da filosofia teórica kantiana(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2019-08-21) GOMES, Paulo Uiris da Silva; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0951-6313This research aims to analyze Karl Popper’s interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy and to discuss its character, problems and merits. Popper’s view on Kant reflects the latter’s relevance and influence over the former’s thoughts. Popper acknowledges, in many of his works, Kant’s contribution to his own theory of Science. However, at the same time that he praises kantian philosophy, he also criticizes it in many ways, considering himself as an unorthodox kantian. Therefore, the central problem of the presente research is: how does Popper understands Kant’s theoretical philosophy? And, furthermore, what are the virtues, difficulties and problems of Popper’s interpretation? Our hypothesis is that Popper reads Kant’s philosophy in an epistemological and unorthodox manner, ascribing to Kant problems of his own philosophy and viewing Kant’s work through the lens of his own glasses, thus, “Popper’s Kant” has different ideas and problems than the Kant who wrote the Critique of Pure Reason. Initially, we intend to characterize Popper’s interpretation of Kant as epistemological and, hence, close to the Neo-Kantian school of Marburg. Then, we aim to analytically reconstruct Popper’s interpretation of the allegedly “Kant’s problems”: the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation. Lastly, we mean to critically appraise Popper’s view on Kant, by discussing its limitations and possibilities.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) A natureza e o caráter das leis naturais em Popper(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-03-15) ARAUJO, Caroline Soares de; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781Popper presents, through a series of works and articles, different characterizations of natural laws. Initially, he defines such laws as strictly universal statements that, due to their logical properties, are falsifiable. In a second moment, as a reply to William Kneale’s criticism, Popper starts to emphasize the necessary character of natural laws. The aim of this research is to determine if these two characterizations presented by Popper concerning natural laws are either divergent either complementary and if there is any contradiction between these two conceptions and the theory of science supported by the philosopher. Therefore, the problem of this research is structured around popperian’s characterization of natural laws and the concept of physical necessity, apparently contradicting the falsifiable nature that the philosopher assigns to these laws in previous works. We defend the hypothesis that the idea of laws as statements that express necessity just apparently contradicts Popper’s falsificationism and conjecturalism. Actually, it completes the first characterization of laws as strictly universal statements, being, the way it was formulated, consistent with popperian theory of science.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) A objetividade do conhecimento e a deposição do sujeito na epistemologia de Popper(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-09-04) RABELO, Wallace Andrew Lopes; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781The aim of this work is to investigate how objective knowledge is possible for Popper and to elucidate why the subject does not play a relevant role in the process of knowing. Popperian conception moves away from the epistemological tradition that values the subject in the process of knowing, understood by the philosopher as subjectivist view, compared with his objectivist view. In this sense, we intend to demonstrate that his conception of objective knowledge is based on a theory of three worlds, which is fundamental for the comprehension of it, since it’s precisely in world three that the products of subject reside, thus where objective knowledge is. We will show that this third world is linguistic, highlighting the importance of language for knowledge to become objective. Another aspect we intend to analyze is scientific objectivity, since Popper, besides objective knowledge in general, talks on his works about a more specific dimension related to science. We intend to clarify the logical-empirical and social conditions that allowed the debate and criticism of produced theories and, consequently, scientific objectivity. Lastly, we will present criticism of Thomas Kuhn to Popperian conception of objectivity. Since the philosopher does not make a direct critique to the way Popper conceives it, we will highlight his objections to Popper’s falsificationism and his considerations about subjective factors that influence the process of choosing theories, thus, risking the possibility of scientific objectivity.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) A reestruturação Kuhniana da tese da incomensurabilidade nos escritos pós-estrutura(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2016-08-31) NASCIMENTO, Elder Souza do; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781This study aims to examine the thesis of incommensurability between paradigmatic traditions separated by a revolution, as presented by Kuhn in his major work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, as well as the changes that it has undergone in the later writings of the philosopher. The problem that will guide our research has mainly focused clarify the reasons that lead Kuhn to restructure its conception of incommensurability in their PostStructure studies. In our view the reasons Kuhn change of position in his thesis of that approach, derive from the criticism he suffered in 1965, at the International Conference on Philosophy of Science. Among the criticisms that are analyzed in this paper, we highlight those made by Popper, who sees the thesis of incommensurability the defense of relativism, but also criticism of Lakatos, accusing Kuhn to be the defender of irrationalism in science. We hold that the philosopher restructures the thesis of incommensurability, in its PostStructure written in order to clarify the problem areas highlighted by its critics. We believe that his new position, which advocates local incommensurability, is more consistent and coherent than before, because it ensures the communicability and the choice between competing paradigms, thus overcoming the accusations of relativism and irrationalism. In order to present a possible solution to the outlined problem, the work will be developed in three chapters. In the first we present a complete analysis of how Kuhn sees the thesis of incommensurability in his work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the second chapter, we will highlight the problematic aspects of the thesis that led the philosopher to be accused of defending the irrationalism and relativism in science. Finally, in the third chapter, we will seek to develop as Kuhn, in his postscripts, will seek to overcome the problems inherent in his thesis of incommensurability resorting to philosophy of language.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) Senso comum e Ciência em popper(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2020-11-25) SILVA, Adam Augusto Silva e; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0951-6313This The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between common sense and science in Popper's thought. The problem of our research is presented when Popper denies the ideal of episteme when defining science by its negative character, falseability. That is, his idea that science is fallible knowledge and liable to error clashes with those defended by the epistemological tradition that conceives it as a well-foundedcertain and demonstrated knowledge. Thus, by denying positive characteristics, traditionally recognized as typical of science, Popper's position raises the following question: What status does he reserves to science, since he does not identify it with episteme? In other words, by denying the ideal of episteme, would Popper be reducing science to doxa or common sense? This research will be guided by the hypothesis that Popper is far from reducing science to doxa or common sense, because, although he sees certain proximities between them, he also recognizes that science goes beyond common sense. Thus, in order to highlight Popper's position in the face of the problem outlined, we intend, first, to analyze how the relations between common sense and science have been treated by philosophers since antiquity, such as Plato and Aristotle and, also, more contemporaneously, by Bachelard. Later, we intend to show that, contrary to these philosophers who see doxa and episteme, or common sense and science as distinct forms of knowledge, Popper establishes very close relations between both, but does not reduce science to the level of common sense, to the extent that he conceives it as enlightened common sense.