Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia - PPGFIL/IFCH
URI Permanente desta comunidadehttps://repositorio.ufpa.br/handle/2011/5862
O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia (PPGFIL) do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH) da Universidade Federal do Pará (UFPA). Foi criado em dezembro de 2010 e iniciou suas atividades efetivas em agosto de 2011, como curso de Mestrado em Filosofia, sendo o único na área em toda a Região Norte.
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Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) A natureza e o caráter das leis naturais em Popper(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-03-15) ARAUJO, Caroline Soares de; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781Popper presents, through a series of works and articles, different characterizations of natural laws. Initially, he defines such laws as strictly universal statements that, due to their logical properties, are falsifiable. In a second moment, as a reply to William Kneale’s criticism, Popper starts to emphasize the necessary character of natural laws. The aim of this research is to determine if these two characterizations presented by Popper concerning natural laws are either divergent either complementary and if there is any contradiction between these two conceptions and the theory of science supported by the philosopher. Therefore, the problem of this research is structured around popperian’s characterization of natural laws and the concept of physical necessity, apparently contradicting the falsifiable nature that the philosopher assigns to these laws in previous works. We defend the hypothesis that the idea of laws as statements that express necessity just apparently contradicts Popper’s falsificationism and conjecturalism. Actually, it completes the first characterization of laws as strictly universal statements, being, the way it was formulated, consistent with popperian theory of science.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) A objetividade do conhecimento e a deposição do sujeito na epistemologia de Popper(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-09-04) RABELO, Wallace Andrew Lopes; DIAS, Elizabeth de Assis; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9610357600630781The aim of this work is to investigate how objective knowledge is possible for Popper and to elucidate why the subject does not play a relevant role in the process of knowing. Popperian conception moves away from the epistemological tradition that values the subject in the process of knowing, understood by the philosopher as subjectivist view, compared with his objectivist view. In this sense, we intend to demonstrate that his conception of objective knowledge is based on a theory of three worlds, which is fundamental for the comprehension of it, since it’s precisely in world three that the products of subject reside, thus where objective knowledge is. We will show that this third world is linguistic, highlighting the importance of language for knowledge to become objective. Another aspect we intend to analyze is scientific objectivity, since Popper, besides objective knowledge in general, talks on his works about a more specific dimension related to science. We intend to clarify the logical-empirical and social conditions that allowed the debate and criticism of produced theories and, consequently, scientific objectivity. Lastly, we will present criticism of Thomas Kuhn to Popperian conception of objectivity. Since the philosopher does not make a direct critique to the way Popper conceives it, we will highlight his objections to Popper’s falsificationism and his considerations about subjective factors that influence the process of choosing theories, thus, risking the possibility of scientific objectivity.Item Acesso aberto (Open Access) As representações inconscientes e o Eu Penso em Kant(Universidade Federal do Pará, 2018-01-10) BRITO, Aline Brasiliense dos Santos; SOUZA, Luís Eduardo Ramos de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7892900979434696This research aims to analyze the concept of unconscious representations in Kant and its relation with the concept of transcendental apperception, or the I think. The existence of a gender itself for representations, the unconscious ones, are pointed in several of Kant’s works. Among them can be mentioned in Anthropology in a pragmatic point of view and Criticism on pure reason. They are representations that can be bolded in Kant’s philosophy in two main aspects. The fist one the amplitude, for it holds the theoretical field, that is practical and aesthetic. The second one the positivity, in the sense of performing a positive role both in knowledge production, and in the other mental processes – aesthetic and moral. However, when considering the unconscious concept as opposite of the transcendental apperception principle, a problematical appears: how to understand the existence of those mentioned representations in Kant’s philosophy, if the I think implies in a necessary reference of all representation to the conscience? Kant is very emphatic affirming that, if the representations don’t refer to this principle, they are but nothing to the subject (Criticism of pure reason, B131). As an effect, proposing to give a solution to the problematical, three relevant hypotheses will be raised about this matter. The first one is Locke’s thesis, in which the unconscious representations are not admitted, for the fact that they indicate a contradiction in its own conscience. After all, when the matter is an “I” that not always has conscience of its actions, it is possible to say that there is a certain indetermination concerning the identity of this “I”. The second one is Heidemann’s thesis (2012), according to it, the unconscious representation is divided in two species, in which just one of them, the unconscious by degrees representations, refer to the transcendental apperception. At last, the third thesis is La Rocca’s (2007), in which we agree in almost its whole. Through it, it is possible to understand the transcendental apperception principle, always with a structural possibility, and not as an affectivity in psychological terms – to be conscious or unconscious -, but as a logic structure that concerns to the form by which the representation needs to refer itself.