O principio da razão suficiente na critica da razão pura de Kant e suas apicações: as analogias, as antinomias e os principios regulativos

Abstract

The aim of this master’s thesis is to analyze the nature of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in Kant, as well as its possible relation to other concepts and principles found in the Critique of Pure Reason, in particular, the concept of causality in the Second Analogy, the regulative principles, and the Third Antinomy. Broadly speaking, two main problems and one specific issue will be addressed: (1) What is the nature of the PSR? and (2) In what way is the PSR related to the aforementioned concepts and principles? From the answers to these two main questions, a particular issue will be examined: (3) Is the PSR reducible, or not, to causality in the Second Analogy? Regarding the first problem, this dissertation argues that the PSR has a dual nature in Kant: one logical and the other transcendental. In its first dimension, the PSR is understood as a logical principle that governs all thought, insofar as it prescribes that every judgment must be logically grounded through a relation between a ground (Grund) and a consequent (Folge), a historically justified interpretation with reference to Leibniz and Schopenhauer. In its second dimension, the PSR is defined as a synthetic a priori principle capable of relating to the empirical world, insofar as it provides a systematic set of a priori concepts, reasons, and principles that may refer to the actuality of natural phenomena, as expounded by Kant in his pre-critical and critical writings. Concerning the second problem, this dissertation maintains that both valid and invalid applications of the PSR can be found, by both the understanding and reason, as exemplified respectively in the Second Analogy (valid application of the PSR by the understanding), the principle of homogeneity in regulative principles (valid application of the PSR by reason), and the Third Antinomy (invalid application of the PSR by both the understanding and reason). In this analysis, the dialogue with Scherer and Lu-Adler plays a central role: the former highlights the logical-transcendental character of the PSR as a critical principle of reason, while the latter reinterprets it as the axis of systematic unity among the logical, transcendental, and teleological domains. Finally, regarding the third problem, the discussion about the reducibility (Melo; Longuenesse; Hirata) or irreducibility (Kauark-Leite; Scherer; Lu- Adler) of the PSR to causality in the Second Analogy will be examined in light of the distinction between its logical and transcendental functions. It will be argued that both perspectives are limited when compared to broader considerations about the definition of the PSR (addressed in the first question) and its possible applications to the concepts and principles in the Critique of Pure Reason (addressed in the second question). Thus, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate that the PSR, by articulating formal coherence and objective grounding, constitutes the true critical axis that unifies the logical and transcendental dimensions of Kantian thought—that is, the point at which thinking encounters both its own foundation and the limit of its legitimacy.